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NORFOLK SOUTHERN RWY. CO. V. JAMES N. KIRBY (02-1028)
Ruling Below: James N. Kirby v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., 11th Cir., 300 F.3d 1300, 2002 AMC
2113; 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 910
Whether a railroad's liability, if any, to a shipper for damage done to goods by the derailment of
a train is limited by the "Himalaya clause" in either of two bills of lading that were issued for the
transport of the goods. A Himalaya clause is a clause in a bill of lading that extends the carrier's
defenses and limitations of liability under the bill to the carrier's agents and subcontractors.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether a cargo owner that contracts with a freight forwarder for transportation of goods to a
destination in the United States is bound by the contracts that the freight forwarder makes with
carriers to provide that transportation.
2. Whether federal maritime law requires that terms of a bill of lading extending liability
limitations under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315,
to "independent c ontractors" used to perform the contract o ftransportation must be narrowly
construed to cover only those independent contractors in privity of contract with the bill's issuer.
COOPER INDUSTRIES V. AVIALL SERVICES (02-1192)
Ruling Below: Aviall Servs. v. Cooper Indus., 5th Cir., 312 F.3d 677
The buyer purchased from the seller property that was contaminated with hazardous substances.
To recover some of the millions of dollars it had incurred in cleanup expenses, the buyer sought
contribution from the seller. Both parties conceded that they were potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) under CERCLA. Holding that the buyer could not yet assert a claim for contribution
under CERCLA because it had not been subjected to an action under CERCLA § 106 or 107(a),
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9606 or 9607(a) (§§ 106 or 107(a)), the district court granted summary judgment
for the seller on the buyer's CERCLA claim. On appeal, the en bane majority concluded that
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.S. § 9613(f)(1) (§ 113(f)(1)), did not constrain a PRP for
covered pollutant discharges from suing other PRPs for contribution only during or following
litigation commenced under §§ 106 or 107(a). Instead, a PRP could sue at any time for
contribution under federal law to recover CERCLA cleanup costs.
Question Presented: Whether a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil
action pursuant toC ERCLA Sections 106 or 107, 4 2 U.S.C. § § 9 606 or 9 607, may b ring an
action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), to
recover costs spent voluntarily to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances.
660
CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA v. THOMPSON (02-1472)
Ruling Below: Cherokee Nation v. Thompson, 10th Cir., 311 F.3d 1054
The tribes entered into contracts pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.S. § 450-450(n), to operate IHS programs for their members. Although
25 U.S.C.S. § 450j-1(a) required funding for administration of the programs, including payment
of CSC, § 450j-1(b) and the contracts provided that funding was subject to the availability of
appropriations. The tribes claimed that they were entitled to full funding of CSC for fiscal years
1996 and 1997, but the appellate court disagreed. With respect to ongoing programs, the tribes
failed to show that the IHS's claim that the available funds were exhausted was invalid. As for
new or expanded contracts, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 314, 112 Stat. 2681-288 (1998), capped the
available CSC funds at $ 7.5 million for each of the years in question, and those funds had been
disbursed. Section 314 w as clearly intended to have a retroactive effect on the availability of
funds, and § 314 did not breach any vested rights of the tribes given that the obligation to pay
CSC was expressly subject to availability of appropriations.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether the federal government can repudiate, without liability, express contractual
commitments for which it has received valuable consideration, either by spending down
discretionary agency appropriations otherwise available to pay its contracts, or simply by
changing the law and the contracts retroactively.
2. Whether government contract payment rights that are contingent on "the availability of
appropriations" vest when an agency receives a lump-sum appropriation that is legally available
to pay the contracts (as is the law of the Federal Circuit under Blackhawk Heating) or whether
the government's liability is calculated only at the end of the year after the agency has spent its
appropriations on other activities (as the Tenth Circuit ruled below).
THOMPSON v. CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA (03-853)
Ruling Below: Thompson v. Cherokee Nation, Fed. Cir., 334 F.3d 1075
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450-450n,
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to enter into contracts
with Indian Tribes for the administration of programs the Secretary otherwise would administer
himself. The ISDA also provides that the Secretary shall pay "contract support costs" to cover
certain direct and indirect expenses incurred by the Tribes in administering those contracts. The
ISDA, however, makes payment "subject to the availability of appropriations," and declares that
the S ecretary " is n ot required to reduce funding for p rograms, projects or a ctivities s erving a
tribe to make funds available" for contract support and other selfdetermination contract costs. 25
U.S.C. 450j-](b).
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Questions Presented:
1. Whether the ISDA requires the Secretary to pay contract support costs associated with
carrying out self-determination contracts with the Indian Health Service, where appropriations
were o therwise i nsufficient to fully fund those costs and w ould require r eprogramming funds
needed for noncontractable, inherently federal functions such as having an Indian Health Service.
2. Whether Section 314 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No.105-277, 112 Stat. 2681- 288, bars respondent from
recovering its contract support costs.
WILKINSON V. DOTSON (03-287)
Ruling Below: Dotson v. Wilkinson, 6th Cir., 329 F.3d 463, 2003 FED App. 0147P
This petition arises from one of the many cases considering which prisoner claims are barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck holds that a prisoner cannot advance a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where success on that claim would "necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence... unless.. .the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated."
This is Heck's so- called "favorable termination requirement." The Sixth Circuit concluded
below that Heck's favorable termination requirement does not cover claims challenging parole
procedures because success on those claims would not necessarily guarantee speedier release,
but instead would provide only a new parole hearing.
Questions Presented:
1. When a prisoner invokes § 1983 to challenge parole proceedings, does Heck v. Humphrey's
favorable termination requirement apply where success by the prisoner on the claim would result
only in a new parole hearing and not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison?
2. Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily imply the invalidity
of' the decision at the previous parole hearing for purposes of Heck v. Humphrey?
KOWALSKI V. TESMER (03-407)
Ruling Below: Tesmer v. Granholm, 6th Cir., 333 F.3d 683, 2003 FED App. 0202P, 55 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1355
The Michigan Constitution, Mich Const 1963, art I, §20, provides that a criminal defendant who
pleads guilty shall not have an appeal of right and shall have a right to appointed appellate
counsel "as provided by law." A Michigan statute, Michigan Compiled Law (MCL) 770.3a,
provides, with significant listed exceptions, that criminal defendants who plead guilty shall not
have appointed appellate counsel for discretionary appeals for review of the defendant's
conviction or sentence.
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Questions Presented:
1. Does the 14th Amendment guarantee a right to an appointed appellate attorney in a
discretionary first appeal of an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea?
2. Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential future indigent criminal
defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of
appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas where the
federal courts properly abstained from hearing the claims of indigent criminal defendants
themselves?
KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP, INC. V. LASTING IMPRESSIONS, INC. (03-409)
Ruling Below: KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 9th Cir., 328 F.3d
1061, 66 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1509; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 4735
The parties, direct competitors in the permanent makeup industry, sold their pigments to the
same end users. The trademark owner's "micro colors" mark, as registered, became
incontestable. The district court found that the term "micro colors" was generic or descriptive,
the competitor could continue to use the term, and the competitor's use was protected under the
"fair use" defense under 15 U.S.C.S. § 11 15(b)(4). However, the appellate court determined that
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of generieness because a reasonably
minded jury could not conclude from the evidence produced that "micro colors" was a generic
term. Also, defendants' incontestable registration was conclusive evidence that the mark was
non-descriptive or had acquired secondary meaning. Finally, summary judgment was not
appropriate for deciding the fair use defense issue. The case concerned the classic fair use
defense and the competitor needed to show that there was no likelihood of confusion between the
competitor's use of the term and the mark. Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
there was a likelihood of confusion.
Questions Presented:
1. Does the classic fair use defense to trademark infringement require the party asserting the
defense to demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion, as is the rule in the 9th Circuit, or
is Fair Use an absolute defense, irrespective of whether or not confusion may result, as is the rule
in other Circuits?
2. Whether the classic "fair use" defense to trademark infringment requires the party asserting
the defense to demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion (9th Circuit rule) or is "fair
use" defense absolute (other circuits)?
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DEVENPECK V. ALFORD (03-710)
Ruling Below: Alford v. Haner, 9th Cir., 333 F.3d 972 (2003), 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service
5407; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 6902
Under the 4th Amendment's objective reasonableness test, an arrest is deemed "reasonable" if
there is probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. Two judicial circuits find
an arrest reasonable if, based on an objective assessment by a reasonable officer, there is
probable cause to arrest for any offense. On the other hand, at least five judicial circuits find an
arrest to be reasonable only if there is probable cause to arrest for crimes "closely related" to the
crime or crimes articulated by the arresting officer.
Questions Presented:
1. Does an arrest violate the 4th Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make
an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the
officer at the time of the arrest?
2. For the purpose of qualified immunity, was the law clearly established when there was a split
in the circuits regarding the application of the "closely related offense doctrine", the 9th Circuit
had no controlling authority applying the doctrine, and Washington state law did not apply the
doctrine?
PASQUANTINO V US (03-725)
Ruling Below: US v Pasquantino, 4th Cir., 336 F.3d 321
Defendants were convicted of using interstate wires for the purpose of executing a scheme to
defraud Canada and the Province of Ontario of excise duties and tax revenues related to imported
liquor. Defendants' primary argument was that the district court erred in denying their motion to
dismiss because the common law revenue rule precluded their prosecution under the wire fraud
statute, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1343. The court affirmed the convictions. The court concluded that it could
not presume that when Congress enacted the wire fraud statute in 1952, it did so with the intent
that any prosecution thereunder could not involve recognition or observance of the revenue laws
of a foreign sovereign. Without such a presumption, the court had no basis upon which to ignore
the plain language of § 1343, which language squarely encompassed defendants' conduct. The
court rejected defendants' contention that a government's right to collect accrued tax revenue
was not a property right for purposes of § 1343. The court also found sufficient evidence to
support the convictions. Finally, the court found no error in the district court's calculation of
fraud loss for sentencing purposes.
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Question Presented: Whether the federal wire fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1343) authorizes
criminal prosecution of an alleged fraudulent scheme to avoid payment of taxes potentially owed
to a foreign sovereign, given the follwing: (a) the lack of any clear statement by Congress to
override the common law revenue rule, (b) the interests of both the Legislative and Executive
Branches in guiding foreign affairs, and (c) this Court's prior rulings concerning the limited
scope of the term "property" as used in the wire fraud statute.
SMALL V. UNITED STATES (03-750)
Ruling Below: US v. Small, 3rd Cir., 333 F.3d 425
The statute in question, § 922(g)(1) of Title 18, United States Code, makes it unlawful: (g) ...
for any person (1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding o ne year: . . . to p ossess i n or a ffecting c ommerce, a ny firearm. In t he
instant matter, Petitioner's only conviction occurred in Okinawa, Japan, and it was this Japanese
conviction that served as the predicate felony in this § 922(g)(1) prosecution. The Petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the indictment arguing that foreign felonies were not intended to count as the
term "in any court" means any court in the United States. The motion was denied. While the 3rd
Circuit's affimnance of the lower court is consistent with a 1989 decision of the 4th Circuit and a
1986 decision of the 6th Circuit, the 10th Circuit in 2000 and the 2nd Circuit, on August 27,
2003, held that foreign convictions do not count. Consequently, a clear conflict exists among the
five Circuit Courts which have addressed the issue.
Question Presented: Whether the term "convicted in any court" contained in 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(i) includes convictions entered in foreign courts.
STEWART V. DUTRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (03-814)
Ruling Below: Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 1st Cir., 230 F.3d 461, 2001 AMC 1116
Petitioner Willard Stewart was hurt doing his work as a marine engineer assigned to respondent
Dutra Construction Company's dredge Super Scoop. Stewart seeks personal injury damages
from Dutra under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688(a), which affords "any seaman" a
negligence action against his employer. To qualify for "seaman" status under the Jones Act, a
worker must have an "employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation." Chandris, Inc.
v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 357 (1995).
Question Presented: What is the legal standard for determining whether a special purpose
watercraft (such as a dredge) is a Jones Act "vessel"?
665
CITY OF SHERRILL, NY v ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK (03-855)
Ruling Below: Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill, New York, 2nd Cir., 337
F.3d 139
The city contended that the properties at issue were taxable because they were not currently
located within Indian country. The city asserted that the properties were not in Indian country
because they were neither set aside by the federal government for Indian use nor placed under
federal superintendence. Both of these arguments rested on the claim that the land was no longer
in an Indian reservation. This claim was grounded in the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, 7 Stat.
550 (Jan. 15, 1838), which the city contended formally disestablished the tribal reservation.
Construing the Buffalo Creek Treaty liberally and resolving all ambiguities in the Indian tribe's
favor, the appellate court determined that neither the text nor the circumstances surrounding
passage and implementation of the Buffalo Creek Treaty established a clear congressional
purpose to disestablish or diminish the Indian tribe's reservation. Because the tribe's reservation
was not disestablished and because the contested properties were located within that reservation,
the city could neither tax the land nor evict the Indian tribe.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether aleged reservation I and is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this
Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
("Venetie") where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by
the federal government.
2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of
Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Venetie where the alleged reservation was
established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal
treaty, action or enactment.
3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to
permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's
alleged New York reservation.
4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the
protections of the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status
and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist.
666
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. BANKS' (03-892)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. BANAITIS 2 (03-907)
Rulings Below: 'Banks v. Comm'r, 6th Cir., 345 F.3d 373, 2003 FED App. 0347P, 2003-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,675; 2Banaitis v. Comm'r, 9th Cir., 340 F.3d 1074, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) P50,638, 92 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5834
'The tax court found that the taxpayer could not exclude from gross income money he received
pursuant to an out-of-court settlement, including the portion thereof his attorney had received as
a contingency fee. The tax court also found that, based upon the "duty of consistency" rule, the.
taxpayer was not entitled to an income tax deduction for payments made to his former spouse as
part of their divorce settlement. The appellate court determined that the taxpayer's settlement
proceeds were not excludable from gross income under 26 U.S.C.S. § 104(a)(2). Although some
of the taxpayer's claims were based upon tort or tort-type rights, the taxpayer failed to meet his
burden of showing that his 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1981 and 1983 claims were settled on account of his
personal injuries. However, the portion of the settlement paid to the taxpayer's attorney under a
contingency fee arrangement was excludable from income; the anticipatory assignment of
income doctrine did not apply to the fee paid to the attorney. Also, remand was necessary as to
application of the "duty of consistency" rule because the tax court made no finding that the
taxpayer engaged in a misrepresentation.
2The taxpayer's settlement arose from his employers' improper termination of his employment
and interference with his employment relationship. The "economic" damage portion and the
punitive damage portion of the settlement recovery did not satisfy both aspects of the conjunctive
test under § 104(a)(2), and 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1999). Under Oregon law, the claims sounded
in tort, but the economic and punitive damages were not awarded "on account of' personal
injuries. The personal injuries alleged did not cause the taxpayer's wage loss. Rather, his wage
loss was caused by the improper termination and interference. The punitive damage award was
not causally related to his personal injuries; rather, it was predicated on the defendants' tortious
conduct. Thus, the economic and punitive damage awards should have been included in his gross
income. But, under Oregon law, contingent attorney's fees paid directly to the attorney by the
employers did not constitute a part of the taxpayer's gross income. The application of the
alternative minimum tax did not violate the taxpayer's right to due process; it did not nullify the
outcome of the jury trial.
Question Presented: Whether, under Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
61(a), a taxpayer's gross income from the proceeds of litigation includes the portion of his
damages recovery that is paid to his attorneys pursuant to a contingent fee agreement.
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WHITFIELD V US (03-1293)
HALL V US (03-1294)
Ruling Below: US v. Hall, 11th Cir., 349 F.3d 1320, 17 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 34
Given the absence of any language in 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(h) requiring proof of an overt act, the
court found that an overt act was not an essential element for conviction of conspiracy to commit
money laundering. Accordingly, the jury instructions approved by the district court were proper.
The court found that the evidence in the record to be insufficient to support a finding that the
relationships, if any, between defendant and the victims were of the type to put defendant in any
position of trust under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Defendant's status as a pastor did
not necessarily create a personal trust relationship between himself and the victims. None of the
victims came to defendant's roadshows for spiritual guidance; rather, all of them testified that
they came to invest money, not because defendant was a pastor, but because they wanted to
"double their money." Therefore the two-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 3B1.3 was in error.
Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court should resolve the split between the federal
circuit courts on the issue of whether the commission of an overt act is an essential element of a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), conspiracy to commit money laundering?
ROUSEY V JACOWAY (03-1407)
Ruling Below: Rousey v. Jacoway (In re Rousey), 8th Cir., 347 F.3d 689, 31 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 1622, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) P78,934
The debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Before the petition was filed, the debtors had established IRAs in the form of deposit accounts
from funds rolled over from former employers' pension plans. Neither debtor had deposited
additional funds into the IRAs and the debtors had the option of withdrawing funds at any time
subject to early withdrawal tax penalties. Although appellee trustee did not object to a portion of
the IRAs being categorized as exempt under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d)(5), the bankruptcy court
sustained the trustee's objections to the remaining portions of the IRAs being categorized as
exempt under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d)(10)(E) and the Panel affirmed. Affirming, the court held that
the IRA funds could not be considered exempt under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d)(1 0)(E), under the law
of the Eighth Circuit, when the debtors admitted to having unlimited access to the funds, and the
fund withdrawals were thus not limited to circumstances of illness, disability, death, age, or
length of service, as required by § 522(d)(10)(E).
Question Presented: Should this Court grant certiorari to resolve the three-way circuit conflict
over whether and to what extent Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are exempt from a
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(10)(E)?
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MUEHLER V MENA (03-1423)
Ruling Below: Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 9th Cir., 332 F.3d 1255, 2003 Cal. Daily Op.
Service 5412, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 6892
The jury found that the officers used excessive force and that they restrained the citizen for an
unreasonable period of time during the search of her home. The officers argued that the district
court erred in ruling that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the
judgment, finding that a U.S. Supreme Court decision rendered during trial did not change the
qualified immunity law with respect to the facts in the instant case. The court determined that the
citizen alleged a v iolation o f h er constitutional right under t he Fourth Amendment to b e free
from unreasonable government seizures. The court found that the detention was objectively
unreasonable and that it was unnecessarily degrading and prolonged. Further, the officers'
questions regarding citizenship status and the search of the citizen's purse constituted an undue
invasion of privacy. The court also concluded that the right to be free from such type of search
was clearly established at the time of the search. The court found no error in the jury instruction
on the claim of unlawful detention. Finally, the court found substantial evidence to support the
jury's award of punitive damages.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether, in light of this Court's repeated holdings that mere police questioning does not
constitute a seizure, the 9th Circuit erred in ruling that law enforcement officers who have
lawfully detained an individual pursuant to a valid search warrant engage in an additional,
unconstitutional "seizure" if they ask that person questions about criminal activity without
probable cause to believe that the person is or has engaged in such activity.
2. Whether, in light of this Court's ruling in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), that a
valid search warrant carries with it the implicit authority to detain occupants while the search is
conducted, the 9th Circuit erred in ruling that a two to three hour detention of the occupant of a
suspected gang safe-house while officers searched for concealed weapons and other evidence of
a gang-related drive-by shooting was unconstitutional because the occupant was initially
detained at gun-point and handcuffed for the duration of the search.
MELVIN T SMITH V COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (03-8661)
Ruling Below: Commonwealth v. Smith, Mass. App. Ct., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 788 N.E. 2d
977
Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by reconsidering his ruling on defendant's motion for
a required finding of not guilty after granting it because jeopardy terminated as to that charge and
thus, the decision could not be reversed regardless of whether the judge was factually or legally
in error. The appellate court concluded that double jeopardy protections were not violated
because the judge's correction did not require a second proceeding. In addition, the court noted
that the requirement that the Commonwealth present proof of every element of the crime prior to
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deciding whether to rest or introduce other evidence was protected since no additional evidence
was produced by the Commonwealth after defendant's motion was made. The court also noted
that defendant was not prejudiced by the change in ruling since the jury was not aware of the
prior ruling. Next, the appellate court disagreed with defendant that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269,§10(d) did not permit convictions from other jurisdictions to serve as predicate offenses for his
possession offense. Finally, as to defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate
court concluded that they were unwarranted.
Questions Presented:
1. Should this Court grant certiorari to directly review Smith's case and decide the question that,
constrained by the habeas corpus standard of review, it did not reach in the recent case of Price v.
Vincent? That is, whether the double jeopardy clause's prohibition against successive
prosecutions is violated where the judge unequivocally rules that the defendant is not guilty
because the government's evidence is insufficient but later reverses her finding of not guilty?
2. There is a split of opinion among the United States Courts of Appeals and among the state
courts on the question of whether, in similar situations, trial judges violate the double jeopardy
protection against successive prosecution by withdrawing an alreadygranted verdict of not guilty.
Should this Court grant certiorari to clarify its jurisprudence?
RHINES V WEBER (03-9046)
Ruling Below: Rhines v. Weber, 8th Cir., 346 F.3d 799
South Dakota inmate Charles Russell Rhines filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that numerous constitutional errors infected his 1993 first degree murder conviction.
The district court entered an order declaring that Rhines failed to exhaust some federal claims
and that non-futile state court remedies may still be available to him. The court stayed all claims
pending exhaustion of state court remedies for the unexhausted claims. Warden Douglas Weber
appeals. We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review an interlocutory order
holding a habeas [**2] petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of state court remedies.
Carmichael v. White, 163 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1998). This court has recently addressed the
question whether habeas claims may be stayed while the habeas petitioner seeks state court
remedies on claims that maybe unexhausted. Akins v. Kenney, 341 F.3d 681, slip op. at 7-9 (8th
Cir. 2003). Akins precludes the district court from staying Rhines's exhausted claims while he
seeks state post-conviction relief on other claims that may be unexhausted. However, Akins did
not d ecide whether a p etitioner may delete u nexhausted c laims while p roceeding o nly ont he
claims he believes are fully exhausted. Nor did Akins preclude a petitioner from electing to
forego further state court proceedings, in which case he would presumably proceed on all claims
in the federal habeas action and contest any argument by respondent that the unexhausted claims
are procedurally barred. These issues are better addressed initially in the district court.
Accordingly, the district court's order of July 3, 2002 is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further consideration.
670
Questions Presented:
1. Can a federal court stay a section 2254 habeas corpus petition which includes exhausted and
unexhausted claims, when the stay is necessary to permit a petitioner to exhaust claims in state
court without having the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) bar the right to a federal petition?
2. Is the 8th Circuit correct that the dismissal of a mixed section 2254 petition is mandated by
Rose v. Lundy, or are the appeals courts for the Ist, 2nd, 6th, 7th and 9th circuits correct in
following the separate concurrences of Justices Souter and Stevens in Duncan v. Walker that a
stay of an otherwise timely-filed federal petition is permissible in light of the AEDPA?
SHEPARD V US (03-9168)
Ruling Below: US v. Shepard, 1st Cir., 348 F.3d 308
The Armed Career Criminal Act [18 U. S.C. §924(e)] imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of
15 years imprisonment for a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm [18
U.S.C. § 922(g)] where that person has previously been convicted of three violent felonies or
serious drug offenses or both. United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) held that Congress
intended a sentencing court to employ a categorical approach to determine whether a defendant's
prior convictions qualify as predicates for this sentence enhancement, looking only to the fact of
conviction and the elements of the statute of conviction, or to the charging document and the jury
instructions to determine whether all of the elements of generic burglary (an enumerated violent
felony) were necessarily adjudicated in the state court.
Questions Presented:
1. Whether, where the defendant has pleaded guilty to a nongeneric charge of burglary brought
under a nongeneric statute, there is no contemporaneous record of the guilty plea proceedings
and the judgment of conviction reflects a general finding of guilty, the sentencing court is still
bound by Taylor's categorical method of application or may instead be required to conduct an
inquiry - including an evidentiary hearing - into the facts underlying the conviction, to determine
whether, in the guilty plea proceeding, both the defendant and the government believed that
generic burglary was at issue?
2. If so, whether the sentencing court may be required to consider a version of these underlying
facts found in any document in the court file such as an investigative police report or a complaint
application and, if the facts alleged in the document are not challenged by the defendant, regard
them as sufficiently reliable evidence that the defendant was convicted of a crime including all of
the elements of generic burglary to support an Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement?
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HOWELL V MISSISSIPPI (03-9560)
Ruling Below: Howell v. State, Miss., 860 So. 2d 704
Defendant raised 27 issues for review. The supreme court found that defendant did not
demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court's denial of the motion for change of venue.
Nor did it err in denying defendant funds for his defense to hire an investigator, a jury consultant,
limited daily transcripts, additional counsel, and additional psychiatric evaluation. The circuit
clerk complied with the statutory requirements in drawing and selecting the jury. The trial court
did not err by allowing the State to exercise its peremptory challenges on two black members of
the venire as race neutral reasons for striking them were provided. Denial of defendant's request
to conduct individual sequestered voir dire was proper. The eyewitness identification was
properly not suppressed, as the lineup was not suggestive. The death sentence was not imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The evidence was more
than sufficient to support the jury's finding of the two statutory aggravating circumstances: a
capital offense committed in the course of a robbery for pecuniary gain and by person under a
sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole.
Question Presented: Whether defendant's death sentence should be overturned?
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The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court
The New York Times
July 5, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
Although it has been 10 years since its
membership last changed, the Supreme
Court that concluded its term last week was,
surprisingly and in important ways, a new
court.
It is too soon to say for sure, but it is
possible that the 2003-4 term may go down
in history as the one when Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist lost his court.
The cases decided in the term's closing days
on the rights of the detainees labeled
"enemy combatants" by the Bush
administration provided striking evidence
for this appraisal. The court ruled that
foreigners imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, as well as American citizens held in
the United States are entitled to contest their
classification before an impartial judge.
The surprise lay not in the outcome: it was
scarcely a great shock, except perhaps to the
administration, that a court preoccupied in
recent years with preserving judicial
authority would reject the bold claim of
unreviewable executive power at the core of
the administration's legal arguments. Rather,
what was most unexpected about the
outcome of the cases was the invisibility of
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
It is a remarkable development. Since his
promotion to chief justice 18 years ago, his
tenure has been notable for the sure hand
with which he has led the court, marshaling
fractious colleagues not only to advance his
own agenda but also to protect the court's
institutional prerogatives.
Four years ago, for example, the court
reviewed a law by which Congress had
purported to overrule the Miranda decision,
a precedent Chief Justice Rehnquist disliked
and had criticized for years. But in the face
of Congress's defiance, he wrote a cryptic
opinion for a 7-to-2 majority that said no
more than necessary about Miranda itself
but found common ground in making clear
that it was the court, not Congress, that has
the last word on what the Constitution
means.
This year, there was every reason to suppose
the chief justice would want to shape the
court's response to the war on terrorism. His
1998 book on the history of civil liberties in
wartime reflected his extensive knowledge
and evident fascination with t he subject by
which the term, if not his entire tenure, was
likely to be known. If there was a message
to be delivered from one branch of
government to another, Chief Justice
Rehnquist figured to be the one to deliver it.
Yet the Guantanamo case found him silently
joining Justice Antonin Scalia's dissenting
opinion as Justice John Paul Stevens
explained for the 6-to-3 majority why the
federal courts have jurisdiction to review the
status of the hundreds of foreigners detained
there.
In the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, the
American-born Saudi taken from the
battlefield in Afghanistan and held since
2002 in a military prison, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was among the eight justices who
found the open-ended detention improper
for either constitutional or statutory reasons.
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But his was not among the several voices
with which the court spoke. He was a silent
member - perhaps even a late-arriving one -
of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's plurality
opinion.
The implication is not that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who turns 80 on Oct. 1, has lost a
step. Nor does he show any interest in
leaving the court, which he joined in 1972 at
the age of 47. A few days ago, in fact, he
hired law clerks for the term beginning in
October 2005, and some people believe he is
aiming to top the record of 36 years set by
Justice William 0. Douglas, or at least to
equal the 34-year tenure of his judicial hero,
Chief Justice John Marshall.
Rather, it appears that while he has stood
still, the court's center of gravity has moved
away from him. One statistic is particularly
telling. There were 18 cases this term
decided by five-member majorities (17 were
5-to-4 decisions and one, the Pledge of
Allegiance case, was 5 to 3 but would surely
have been 5 to 4 had Justice Scalia
participated; he would certainly have agreed
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the
minority, that the court should rule that
"under God" posed no constitutional
problem). Of the 18 cases, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was in the majority in only eight.
That contrasts sharply with the chief
justice's notably successful term two years
ago, when he was in the majority in 15 of 21
5-to-4 decisions. A year ago, he was in the
majority half the time, in 7 of 14 cases with
5-to-4 votes, and was on the losing side in
the most important of those cases, the
decision that upheld affirmative action at the
University of Michigan. He was also on the
losing side in the Texas gay rights case, in
which the court voted 6 to 3 to overturn the
state's criminal sodomy law.
Those were the first stirrings of what
accelerated during the term that began Oct.
6. The chief justice was in dissent i n most
major cases, from the expedited ruling in
December that upheld major provisions of
the new campaign finance law, until the two
decisions last Tuesday, the term's final day,
blocking enforcement of an Internet
pornography law and taking a generous view
of federal court jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute to hear foreign human rights
cases. Also last week, he dissented from the
court's refusal to authorize a police
interrogation tactic designed to induce
suspects to confess despite receiving their
Miranda warnings.
Further, the Rehnquist court's federalism
revolution, with its expansive approach to
state sovereignty and correspondingly
limited view of Congressional power,
appeared this term to stall in its tracks. The
chief justice was on the losing side in the
term's major federalism case, the 5-to-4
decision in Tennessee v. Lane rejecting state
immunity from suit under a provision of the
Americans With Disabilities Act.
A number of other cases had federalism
overtones that a majority of the court either
rejected or ignored. In the case that struck
down the sentencing guidelines in the state
of Washington, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy objected in dissent that the court
was failing to give the states proper respect
for their legislative choices on criminal
justice. Chief Justice Rehnquist also
dissented in that case, which although just
over a week old has already left criminal
sentencing in turmoil around the country.
Opponents of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law objected on state's
rights grounds to limits on the fund-raising
abilities of political parties at the state level.
In upholding the law, over Chief Justice
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Rehnquist's dissent, the court barely
acknowledged the federalism argument.
The chief justice tried and failed to use a
Pennsylvania redistricting case this term to
overturn a 1986 precedent, to which he had
strongly objected at the time, that gave
courts authority to review claims of partisan
gerrymandering. While there were five votes
to reject the particular gerrymander
complaint, one of the five, Justice Kennedy,
refused to go along completely, instead
writing a concurring opinion that kept the
prospect of a successful gerrymander suit
alive for future cases.
The court decided 73 cases with full
opinions during the term. Of the major
cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinion in two. One was the third
of the terrorism detainee cases, that of Jose
Padilla, an American arrested at O'Hare
International Airport in Chicago on
suspicion of being part of a terrorist plot,
who has been held in a military prison for
the last two years without access to court.
The decision postponed resolution of the
case by holding that Mr. Padilla's lawyer
should have filed his habeas corpus petition
in South Carolina rather than in New York.
The second of the chief justice's major
opinions came in an important church-state
case, Locke v. Davey. The question was
whether a state that underwrites college
scholarships for secular study must also
subsidize students who want to study for the
ministry. The argument for the religious
subsidies built on Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the court two years ago in a
school voucher case from Ohio, holding that
it did not violate the Constitution for states
to give parents vouchers for religious school
tuition as part of a general "school choice"
plan.
As a practical matter, the future of the
school-choice movement depended on the
answer to the question Locke v. Davey
brought to the court: if vouchers were
permissible, were they also constitutionally
required? Writing for a 7-to-2 majority, the
chief justice's answer was no. "The state has
merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction," one that was "not
fungible" with ordinary secular studies, he
said over biting dissents from Justices Scalia
and Clarence Thomas.
Largely overlooked in the drama of the
term's higher-profile cases, Locke v. Davey
was an important decision, indicative of the
struggle now going on within the court over
how far to push some of the principles that
the conservative majority has established
over the last 10 years or so.
In t his i nstance, although t he c onsequences
of turning permissible vouchers into
required vouchers would have been
profoundly unsettling, the court's recent
insistence on an equal place for religion at
the public table provided at least a plausible
basis for that outcome. Instead, the majority
looked at the consequences of carrying the
recent precedents to their logical conclusion,
and stopped short.
In fact, as Locke v. Davey demonstrates, the
most consequential debate on the court
today may be not so much over first
principles, but over how far to carry those
principles. That the chief justice was so
often on the losing side this term may not
mean that those who once agreed with him
have changed their minds, but that they
disagree over what to do next.
In Locke v. Davey, the stopping point
appeared clear to a broad majority of the
court. In the Tennessee federalism case, by
contrast, while the chief justice wanted to
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continue pressing the boundaries of state
sovereignty to immunize the state from a
lawsuit by a man who could not reach a
second-floor county courtroom in his
wheelchair, Justice O'Connor decided that
Tennessee v. Lane was not the case in which
to push sovereign immunity to its logical
conclusion.
The outcome was reminiscent of the court's
decision a year ago in the Michigan
affirmative action case. Justice O'Connor,
long skeptical of all official policies that
take account of race, joined Justices Stevens,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H. Souter and
Stephen G. Breyer to uphold the law
school's admissions plan, essentially on the
ground that diversity was good for the
country.
Pragmatism rather than doctrine seems to be
the order of the day at the court now. Justice
O'Connor, perhaps the court's leading
pragmatist, cast only five dissenting votes in
the entire term, far fewer than anyone else,
and was in the majority in 13 of the 18 most
closely decided cases, more o ften than any
other justice. She formed strategic alliances
with other justices, for example writing an
unusual joint opinion with Justice Stevens
that upheld the central portions of the
campaign finance law.
Justice Stevens displayed his own strategic
skills, finely honed during a 29-year tenure
that has made him the senior associate
justice, in a position to a ssign t he majority
opinion in all cases where the chief justice is
in dissent. He tailored his majority opinion
in Tennessee v. Lane to Justice O'Connor's
comfort level, for example, and crafted a
procedural opinion that removed the highly
sensitive Pledge of Allegiance case from the
court's docket with surgical precision,
leaving no precedent behind. At 84, his
intellectual energy appears undimmed, and
he told a gathering of his former law clerks a
few weeks ago that he has no retirement
plans.
So when the new term begins on Oct. 4, the
same justices will reassemble for a highly
unusual 11th year together. The juvenile
death penalty and medical marijuana are
among the cases already on a docket that
may continue pushing these nine people, so
familiar to each other, in new directions.
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All Hail the Supreme Court: The Nine Justices Agree That They Know What is Best
Legal Times
July 19, 2004
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
Liberals say the Supreme Court is too
conservative. Conservatives say it's too
liberal. But many experts in both camps
agree that the nine current justices have
taken us too far down the road of judicial
supremacy.
In an end-of-term speech on July 9, outgoing
Solicitor General Theodore Olson told the
conservative Federalist Society that this may
be "the most powerful Court in the nation's
history." While the justices "have deep
disagreements about how the country should
be governed," observed D.C. appellate
lawyer Miguel Estrada at a July 12 Heritage
Foundation forum, "they all agree that they
should be governing the country." The Court
"seems incapable of admitting that some
matters - any matters - are none of its
business," complained Justice Antonin
Scalia in a June 29 dissent.
Nor is this just conservative sour grapes. At
the same Heritage forum, Walter Dellinger
III, a leading Democratic scholar who was
President Bill Clinton's acting solicitor
general in 1996 and 1997, enthusiastically
seconded Scalia's complaint and added,
"This Court puts itself at the center of the
constitutional universe.... It's rather striking,
the Court's lack of deference to anyone
else."
No Deference to Congress. Especially
striking is the Court's pattern of treating
Congress, in which the Constitution vests
"all legislative powers," as a junior partner
in the law-making process.
Take the June 29 decision in Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, barring
enforcement for now [and probably forever]
of the Child Online Protection Act of 1998,
in which Congress required Internet sellers
of hard-core commercial pornography to
verify that each online visitor was 18 or
older before letting the visitor see their smut.
The criminal statute was adopted after the
justices in 1997 had struck down the much
broader Communications Decency Act of
1996. The 1998 law reflected Congress'
painstaking effort to "meet each and every
criticism of the predecessor statute that this
Court set forth, [and] protect children from
exposure to obscene professional
pornography without obstructing adult
access to material that the First Amendment
protects," in the words of Justice Stephen
Breyer's dissent.
But that did not stop the majority, in an
opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, from
nullifying the 1998 law unless and until the
government can prove that no "less
restrictive" protections for children could
possibly be devised. "The Court in effect
gave Congress the finger," observes Paul
Rosenzweig of the Heritage Foundation.
The same day, the justices ruled 6-3 that
federal courts may entertain lawsuits by
foreigners claiming to b e v ictims of s evere
human rights violations anywhere in the
world. Justice David Souter's majority
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain styled
this as an interpretation of the long-dormant
Alien Tort Statute of 1789. He followed the
reasoning [while disapproving of some
results] of lower courts that, since about
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1980, have read the statute as authorizing
international human rights suits - even
though Congress clearly had no such intent,
either in 1789 or since. Scalia's dissent
called this "the latest victory for [the
Court's] 'Never Say Never' Jurisprudence."
No Deference to the President. The Court on
June 28 rejected by a stunning 8-1 vote
President George W. Bush's claim of power
to hold U.S. citizens suspected of being
"enemy combatants" incommunicado for
years, perhaps decades, with no meaningful
judicial review.
The decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was
basically right, in my view. But the justices
gave disturbingly short shrift to the
government's argument against giving such
detainees immediate access to lawyers, I est
the attorneys disrupt interrogations and thus
"interfere with the military's compelling
interest in gathering intelligence to further
the war effort."
In Rasul v. Bush, handed down the same
day, the Court squashed by 6-3 Bush's
argument that no court could question his
detention of non-American prisoners
overseas, including the hundreds held at the
Guantanamo Bay naval base. This prompted
Scalia to complain in dissent that the Court
had extended its powers "to the four corners
of the Earth," risking "conflict between
judicial and military opinion highly
comforting to enemies of the United States."
No Deference to the States. Scalia broke
some furniture himself in a 5-4 decision on
June 24 that threw the sentencing systems of
about a dozen states into chaos, along with
the federal government's own
congressionally ordained sentencing
guidelines. Scalia's opinion in Blakely v.
Washington held that the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury bars use of judicial fact-
findings to increase any defendant's
sentence beyond the ordinary range for his
enme.
This time it was Kennedy's turn to accuse
Scalia of dissing democracy, by engineering
"the destruction of a sentencing scheme
devised by democratically elected
legislators." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
separate dissent attacked the potentially
"disastrous" Scalia opinion for imposing a
"rigid rule that destroys everything in its
path," including "over 20 years of
sentencing reform" by states and Congress.
So much for judicial restraint.
No Deference to the Court's Own
Precedents. Administration lawyers had
initially been confident of winning the
Guantanamo case because under a 1950
Supreme Court precedent, Johnson v.
Eisentrager, federal courts lacked
jurisdiction to hear petitions from foreigners
held by the government outside the United
States. But the administration
underestimated the ingenuity of Justice John
Paul Stevens. He wrote for the majority that
Eisentrager had been effectively overruled
by a 1973 decision, Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, which did not
even mention it. This was, as Scalia wrote
for the dissenters, "implausible in the
extreme."
All nine justices complain when high court
precedents that they like are disregarded.
But not one is consistently willing to "accept
legal precedent as binding" when it stands in
the way of what he or she wants to do,
Estrada said at the Heritage forum. They
"really don't care about acting like a court
[and thus are] not really doing [their] job,"
he asserted. Other experts add that by
deciding many cases on such narrow
grounds as to leave unclear what the Court
will do when facing similar issues in the
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future, the justices shirk their cardinal duty
to tell litigants and lower courts what the
law is.
Touch Not The Pledge
In short, none of the nine consistently
practices judicial restraint. And when the
justices do invoke that ideal, it is often an
exercise in disingenuousness. Take the 5-3
decision on June 14 in Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow, which ducked
the merits of the case in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit had
ruled that "under God" must be dropped
when the Pledge of Allegiance is recited in
public schools.
The case presented a dilemma for the four
liberals and Kennedy. A decision striking
out "under God" would have provoked an
election-year firestorm, perhaps even a
constitutional amendment. But that was the
outcome required by any honest reading of
the most relevant precedent, a 1992 decision
titled Lee v. Weisman, in which Kennedy
had tortured language and logic to find that a
brief, nondenominational, nonparticipatory
prayer by a rabbi at a middle-school
graduation amounted to unconstitutional
"compulsion" of all students to "participate
in a religious exercise."
Stevens escaped this box by seizing upon a
dispute between the atheist father, who had
brought the lawsuit to bar his daughter's
school from reciting "under God," and the
girl's mother, who disagreed. To avoid
intruding into this family law dispute, wrote
Stevens for the majority, the lower courts
should have invoked the "prudential
standing" doctrine to dismiss the case. The
Stevens twist on this doctrine was so
contrived that it's hard to imagine any of the
majority justices taking it seriously had they
not been so desperate to hide the radical
implications of their own graduation-prayer
precedent.
Yet We Listen
Given all these complaints from critics
across the ideological spectrum, why do we
put up with these self-aggrandizing judicial
legislators? Why do they outpoll Congress
and the executive in terms of public
confidence? Why has no modem president
ever dared defy them?
One reason is that all nine justices are
credited, even b y c ritics, with b eing highly
capable and honorably motivated by their
visions of the public good, rather than by
pursuit of votes, campaign money, or self-
enrichment. A second reason is that the two
who control the outcomes of the biggest
cases, O'Connor and Kennedy, have
moderate political philosophies and never
stray very far from the mainstream of public
opinion - or, at least, of elite opinion. A
third reason is that the justices provide an
indispensable check against abuses by the
states and the elected branches.
Congress has largely abdicated its own duty
to restrain the wartime president. So the
Court stood alone against Bush's frightening
claim of power to seize anyone in the world,
at any time, and hold him incommunicado,
perhaps for decades, with no semblance of
due process. A more restrained or timid
group of justices might have acquiesced.
For myself, I hate the Court's relentless
aggrandizement of its own powers - except
when I like it.
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Off the Bench
The New York Times
August 29, 2004
Dahlia Lithwick
And with a blink, summer's over. A chill
touches the air, sunlight softens to gold, and
brightly colored war protesters begin to drop
from the trees in Central Park.
Presidential candidates are everywhere - in
our stadiums and town halls, clogging up
our parks and porches, our televisions and
our computer screens. Every baby is kissed;
every hand shaken. They beg us to know
them, to peer inside their hearts and really
understand who they are.
Which makes it all the more arresting that
nine Supreme Court justices have just spent
another summer like vacationing Greek
gods, frolicking among us, blending right in.
"What do U.S. Supreme Court justices do
each summer?" you ask. A good question,
raising, implicitly, a better question: What
do they do, ever? Where do they live? What
do they read? What are their favorite shows?
Do they speak in declarative sentences
around the dinner table - or only in strings
of Socratic hypotheticals?
The Supreme Court is by far the most
mysterious branch of government - its
members glimpsed only rarely, like Bigfoot,
crashing through the forest at twilight. The
court is the one branch that operates in near
secrecy - no cameras, no tape recorders, no
explanations, no press conferences, rare
interviews, no review by other branches.
The most powerful branch is also the most
enigmatic. They love it that way.
So how do the justices spend their summers?
Some travel to exotic locales, where they get
paid lots of money to teach at fabulous
seaside summer law school programs.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg taught at
Hofstra University law school's program in
Nice, France, this summer, while Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist taught at
Tulane's program at Cambridge.
What else do they do with their summers?
Since all four justices over age 70 are
hostages to their mutually-assured-
destruction refusal to retire (each unwilling
to give an opposing president the chance to
fill a seat), they probably do lots of resting.
Even one extra day on that court may mean
casting the deciding vote in Bush v. Kerry -
a case poised to detonate over the legal
landscape this winter, the moment the
recount starts in Ohio.
Shunning travel and speeches, Justice David
Souter - the man who says cameras will be
rolled into the Supreme Court only over his
dead body - hightails it home to New
Hampshire each summer, where, like
Punxsutawney Phil's New England cousin,
he'll hide out until the first Monday in
October. Justice Souter will under no
circumstances be found in a Louisiana duck
blind, where Justice Antonin Scalia is
rumored to spend his summers hunting with
his pal Dick Cheney.
Moreover, that rumor is totally unfair to
Justice Scalia.
Duck season in Louisiana doesn't start until
November.
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Perhaps the most emblematic justice is
Clarence Thomas, who spends much of his
summer touring the country in a used bus
that's been converted into a luxury motor
home. That bus is the perfect symbol for a
man who won't read newspapers, or engage
audiences that don't share his ideology. It
allows him to roam the country,
hermetically sealed and unreachable inside a
moving fortress.
Ultimately, that's what members of the
Supreme Court do each summer - they roam
the world, safe with their secrets, secure in
their lifetime appointments, unaccountable
and unavailable to voters or presidents.
And just as the presidential candidates beg
you to know them - to look deep in their
eyes and see their souls - the Supreme Court
justices beg to be forgotten. They still
believe that their sole authority rests in the
myth that they are oracles. That's why it's
not in their interest to remind you that you'll
be picking the next Supreme Court with
your vote come November. We forget that
appointing judges may be the single most
important thing a president does - it's easy
to forget it when they've fixed it so you
can't even pick Anthony Kennedy out of a
lineup.
(He's the guy who looks like Ken Starr.)
Trust me, beneath their s unblock, and their
duck hats, sit the nine most powerful,
secretive public officials in this land. And
whether you can name them or not is
immaterial. Because after November, that
president whose soul you've come to know
so well is going to start naming a whole lot
of their successors.
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O'Connor Not Confined by Conservatism
USA Today
June 24, 2004
Joan Biskupic
She is an enduring part of Ronald Reagan's
legacy, the first woman justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court. But for years, Sandra Day
O'Connor has confounded many of the
conservatives for whom the late president is
an icon.
On a divided, nine-member court, O'Connor
is a conservative with an asterisk: a
pragmatic jurist who, when she sees fit, will
vote with the four liberal justices.
Particularly galling to some conservative
Republicans has been O'Connor's retreat
from initial stands against abortion rights
and some affirmative action policies.
Lately, the 23-year veteran of the high court
has been giving such critics more reasons to
gripe. Although O'Connor usually votes
with the court's conservative wing, she
increasingly has sided with the liberals in
significant cases that have been decided by
5-4 votes. It's led some conservative
observers of the court to wonder whether
O'Connor, at 74, is turning more to the left.
In May, she broke with her conservative
brethren to cast a decisive vote to let
disabled people sue states for access to
courthouses. Earlier this term, she joined the
court's liberals - John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
Breyer - to preserve key parts of the
McCain-Feingold campaign-finance limits,
which ban unlimited donations from
corporations and unions to national political
parties.
She also joined the liberals in 5-4 rulings
that enhanced the U.S. government's power
to enforce the Clean Air Act on states, and
that allowed taxpayers to sue states to
challenge tax credits that benefit religious
schools.
That all followed a landmark ruling last
summer, when O'Connor's opinion upheld
the use of affirmative action in college
admissions.
Many legal analysts see such votes by
O'Connor as signs of her tendency to view
each case along narrow legal lines. But some
conservatives say she seems to be enticed
more by the left, and that unlike Souter - an
appointee of the first President Bush who
has become a consistent vote for the liberal
wing - they never know when O'Connor
will be with them or against them.
Reagan would be disappointed
With several major rulings due in the next
week as the high court wraps up this term -
including key tests of the Bush
administration's legal strategies in dealing
with suspected terrorists - O'Connor is
being viewed warily by some supporters of
the administration.
"Reagan would be disappointed in her recent
rulings," says Charles Cooper, a Washington
lawyer who was an assistant U.S. attorney
general under Reagan. "It is difficult to
reconcile some of her recent cases and
things she said in the past."
So is O'Connor really showing signs of
latent liberalism after nearly a quarter-
century on the nation's highest court?
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- A closer look at O'Connor's recent
decisions and at others throughout her
tenure - suggests that she often is driven not
by ideology, but by general pragmatism and
life experiences that are atypical among the
current justices.
She was a rancher's daughter who was
taught the virtues of rugged individualism; a
woman lawyer who had trouble finding
work in a profession dominated by men; an
elected Arizona legislator familiar with the
relationship between money and politics,
and a state trial judge who sees access to
courts as fundamental.
Several of O'Connor's recent votes seemed
to reflect those experiences, particularly as
the only current justice who has raised
campaign money and run for public office.
During the past six months, O'Connor was
the only justice who was in the majority to
uphold the new campaign-finance law (a
move that infuriated conservatives) and in
the majority to prevent voting rights lawsuits
against p artisan gerrymanders (a move that
irritated liberals).
"Perhaps I am swayed by my own
experience as a legislator," she said in a note
to a fellow justice when the court first
reviewed partisan gerrymanders in 1986,
and she urged her colleagues to leave them
alone. Such oddly shaped congressional
districts, drawn by the party controlling a
statehouse to favor its candidates, have
become more common in recent years as
parties have used computer programs to
reshape districts.
"There is no question that she has a
distinctive world orientation from the other
justices," says Cardozo Law School
professor Marci Hamilton, a former law
clerk to O'Connor. "But it's more than that.
She is the anti-ideologue. She will never let
theory trump reality."
Other legal analysts say O'Connor has
resisted taking positions that she believes
most Americans would not accept - most
notably on abortion.
"This is a justice who is tempted by
analytical consistency," says David Garrow,
a law professor at Emory University in
Atlanta. "But when analytical consistency
seems to be carrying her to an outcome that
would draw widespread denunciation, she
draws back."
Overall, O'Connor votes most often with
Chief Justice William Rehnquist (80% of the
time during the past four years), and least
often with senior liberal Justice John Paul
Stevens (58% of the time during the same
period).
In most 5-4 rulings, O'Connor votes with
the court's conservatives - Rehnquist,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas. But the percentage of 5-4
rulings in which O'Connor has joined the
liberals has risen in recent years, from 5.6%
in the 1999-2000 term to 28.6% in 2002-
2003.
To many Americans, O'Connor is a symbol
of women's rights because of her historic
ascension to the court. Among Republicans
she forever will be linked to Reagan, who in
1981 fulfilled a campaign promise when he
tapped her as the first woman justice. Today,
her stature is such that few in the GOP dare
to openly criticize her.
At the former president's funeral June 11,
O'Connor, as Reagan requested, read part of
the 1630 sermon by Massachusetts Puritan
John Winthrop expressing the ideals of a
"city on a hill."
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Immediately afterward she flew to Phoenix,
where she received a "distinguished career"
award that night from the State Bar of
Arizona. Looking out at the crowd of 350
who had paid $ 150 a plate to attend a dinner
saluting her, O'Connor praised Reagan for
"opening countless doors to women."
Early lessons in Arizona
O'Connor grew up on a ranch on the
Arizona-New Mexico border, the daughter
of a man who preached individual initiative
and resented the New Deal welfare of
Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. When she
became a judge, she would show a similar
distaste for the U.S. government's
intervention in local affairs and would
emphasize states' rights, a frequent theme
on today's Supreme Court.
At age 16 in 1946, she entered Stanford
University, where, she has said, she thrived
and became interested in notions of
community and the power of the law.
But O'Connor has said that when she
graduated from law school in 1952 she was
rejected by every law firm to which she
applied. One firm offered her a job as a legal
secretary - "depending on my typing,"
O'Connor recalled at the Phoenix dinner.
She declined it.
O'Connor wound up working in a county
attorney's office. She eventually returned to
Arizona and quickly rose through the ranks
of state politics.
A Republican loyalist, O'Connor worked on
Barry Goldwater's Senate re-election bid in
1958, passing out bumper stickers and
stuffing envelopes. In 1972, she was an
Arizona co-chairman of Richard Nixon's
presidential re-election campaign.
From 1969-1975, she was a state senator.
For two of those years, she was Senate
majority leader, the first woman to hold such
a post in the nation. Under the copper dome
of Arizona's capitol, O'Connor learned to
maneuver for her legislative priorities and to
build consensus - experience that now
seems to help her negotiate with justices
who are more conservative or more liberal
than she is.
During her first several years on the
Supreme Court, O'Connor regularly lined up
with fellow conservatives Warren Burger
(who was then the chief justice) and
Rehnquist, a classmate of O'Connor's from
Stanford who became the chief after Burger
retired in 1986.
But even in her first term, she broke from
the right in a major case involving a
Mississippi man who had been rejected by a
state-run nursing school.
O'Connor cast the fifth vote in favor of Joe
Hogan, who claimed that the state-run
school violated the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection under the law by
excluding men. In the opinion she wrote for
the court, she said excluding men from nurse
training "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively women's
job."
Her move away from conservatives on
abortion was gradual.
In opinions in 1983 and 1986, she said the
legal rationale of Roe vs. Wade, the 1973
ruling that made abortion legal nationwide,
was "unworkable." In dissenting opinions
with other conservatives, she backed state
abortion limits.
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But in 1989, O'Connor appeared to have
misgivings about where the court - with the
addition of more conservative jurists - was
headed on abortion, and she softened her
criticism of Roe. In 1992, she voted to
uphold a woman's right to end a pregnancy
and emphasized, in an opinion with
Kennedy and Souter, how long women had
relied on the Roe ruling.
Embracing affirmative action
A case last June that challenged racial
preferences in college admissions played to
O'Connor's experience as a young lawyer
and her willingness to back away from a
legal principle for pragmatic reasons.
Before the University of Michigan case,
O'Connor generally had opposed
government policies that favored minorities
because of their race.
But arguments about the value of diversity
in education won O'Connor's vote in the
Michigan dispute, and she joined the
majority in a 5-4 ruling in favor of
affirmative action. The justice who has said
she felt poorly prepared for college but then
blossomed at Stanford wrote that the "path
to leadership" offered by education must be
open to all qualified students.
Last December, O'Connor again was the
fifth vote, joining the liberals to uphold the
campaign-finance overhaul named for Sens.
John McCain, R-Ariz., and Russ Feingold,
D-Wis. The law banned unregulated
contributions from corporations and labor
groups to political parties, and restricted
political ads on TV.
The opinion she wrote with Stevens
acknowledged that "money, like water, will
always find an outlet" to influence politics.
It also emphasized deference to elected
lawmakers.
Last month, O'Connor was back with the
court's liberal wing as she broke with her
usual pattern of protecting states from
lawsuits based on federal civil rights laws.
In a case brought by a man in a wheelchair
who had to crawl up courthouse steps to get
to a hearing, the court voted 5-4 to allow
people to sue states under the Americans
with Disabilities Act for access to
courthouses.
O'Connor is familiar with the gritty side of
local courts. She first donned a black robe
for trials in a dingy Phoenix courtroom
where she kept a can of bug spray to fight
off cockroaches. In the ADA case, she
joined an opinion by Stevens that stressed
the importance of allowing people to
participate in the judicial process.
Todd Gaziano, legal director of the
conservative Heritage Foundation and a
former Reagan administration lawyer, says
O'Connor's vote in the disability case
undermined earlier decisions in which she
joined the court's conservatives. He says she
deviated from rulings that set a high
standard for when federal civil rights laws
should be imposed on the states.
"She's certainly a disappointment" to
conservatives, he says.
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